000			01969naa a2200181uu 4500
001			1111018135441
003			OSt
005			20190211180139.0
008			111110s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aCLARKSON, Gavin _933578
245	1	0	_a‘Keep out’ signs : _bthe role of deterrence in the competition for resources
260			_aU.S.A : _bWiley-Blackwell, _cnov. 2010
520	3		_aTo explain resource heterogeneity, past research focuses on how rivals' resources are hidden from firms and firms accordingly have difficulties accessing them. We argue that resource heterogeneity may also arise when firms are deterred from a technological space upon being shown what resources rivals already possess within that space. To illustrate this deterrence effect, we use patent reexamination certificates, which indicate strategic stakes within a technological space without materially disclosing additional details of the underlying technologies and hence avoid the confounding effect of attracting competition through disclosure. We demonstrate how rivals' reexamination certificates within a technological space induce a firm to subsequently allocate less inventive effort in that space, based on two mechanisms—indications of rivals' developmental speed and exclusionary ability. We further develop these two mechanisms by arguing that the deterrence effect is stronger when rivals' speed is enhanced by their downstream capabilities, or when rivals' exclusion is enhanced by their litigation experiences. Findings suggest that a firm's path of resource accumulation evolves through avoidance of rivals' paths, and deterrence may constitute a viable alternative theory of resource heterogeneity. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
700	1		_aTOH, Puay Khoon _945384
773	0	8	_tStrategic Management Journal _g31, 11, p. 1202-1225 _dU.S.A : Wiley-Blackwell, nov. 2010 _xISSN 01432095 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20111110 _b1813^b _cGeisneer
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c40982 _d40982
041			_aeng