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100 1 _aSOUDER, David
_945389
245 1 0 _aConstraints and incentives for making long horizon corporate investments
260 _aU.S.A :
_bWiley-Blackwell,
_cdec. 2010
520 3 _aThis paper examines the conditions under which firms make long horizon investments (i.e., investments that take a long period of time to pay off). We predict firms are constrained from making long horizon investments when short-term performance is poor—and this effect is especially pronounced for young firms. Moreover, we argue that when managers hold high levels of exercisable stock options, their firms are less likely to make long-term investments. However, firms are more likely to pursue long horizon investments when managerial stock options are not yet exercisable. Based on analysis of investments made by cable television operators from 1972–1996, we find support for these predictions. In addition to enhancing our understanding of investment choices, these results—derived from the temporally focused analysis of an investment's payoff horizon—suggest that payoff horizon is an important investment attribute in its own right and should be analyzed distinctly from and in addition to other aspects of investments, such as expected return and risk. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
700 1 _aSHAVER, J. Myles
_922885
773 0 8 _tStrategic Management Journal
_g31, 12, p. 1316-1337
_dU.S.A : Wiley-Blackwell, dec. 2010
_xISSN 01432095
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20111111
_b1543^b
_cGeisneer
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c40990
_d40990
041 _aeng