000			01651naa a2200241uu 4500
001			2040317223141
003			OSt
005			20240730062620.0
008			120403s2010 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aLAPUENTE, Victor _938778
245	1	0	_aA tale of two cities : _bbureaucratisation in mayor-council and council-manager municipalities
260			_aOxfordshire : _bTaylor & Francis, _cdec. 2010
520	3		_aThis paper presents a theory that predicts under what circumstances self-interested politicians ‘bureaucratise’ their administrations, in the sense that they delegate the powers to hire, fire and promote public employees to autonomous bodies (like civil service commissions). The main testable proposition is that, in polities with a higher concentration of powers, politicians will bureaucratise their administrations to overcome time inconsistency problems in their relationships with public employees. This prediction is tested with data drawn from US municipalities, where two main types of local governments co-exist: mayor-council and council-manager. Results show that municipal governments with a higher concentration of powers (i.e. mayor-council) tend to have more bureaucratised administrations
650		4	_aAdministração Regional _912242
650		4	_912062 _a Relações Intergovernamentais
650		4	_912780 _aServiço Público
650		4	_aAdministração Municipal _912030
650		4	_912662 _a Burocracia
773	0	8	_tLocal Government Studies _g36, 6, p. 739-757 _dOxfordshire : Taylor & Francis, dec. 2010 _xISSN 03003930 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20120403 _b1722^b _cGeisneer
998			_a20120813 _b1549^b _cKeicielle
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c41958 _d41958
041			_aeng