000			01782naa a2200181uu 4500
001			6071316571047
003			OSt
005			20190211181619.0
008			160713s2015 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aFONT, Nuria _954489
245	1	0	_aPolicy properties and political influence in post-delegation : _bthe case of EU agencies
260			_aLos Angeles : _bSage, _cDec. 2015
520	3		_ahe literature on EU agencies has examined the issue of political control and independence in EU agency design and in post-delegation. However, studies measuring and providing accounts for the political influence that the Commission, the member states and the European Parliament exert in decision-making across a wide sample of EU agencies are missing in the specialized literature. This article addresses this topic and poses the following questions: How influential is each of the main parent institutional actors on agency boards' decision-making? Do agency powers and policy properties affect political influence? Based on an online survey, documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews, this article combines a quantitative and a qualitative study identifying differentiated patterns of political influence by supranational and intergovernmental actors. Regulatory functions and saliency decrease the leverage of the Commission and the European Parliament, whereas complexity decreases the influence of the member states. Moreover, highly centralized and far-reaching regulatory activity affects institutional balances in post-delegation
773	0	8	_tInternational Review of Administrative Sciences _g81, 4, p. 773-792 _dLos Angeles : Sage, Dec. 2015 _xISSN 00208523 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20160713 _b1657^b _cAna
998			_a20170811 _b1112^b _cLarissa
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c50867 _d50867
041			_aeng