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100 | 1 |
_aDIMITROV, Martin K. _954888 |
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245 | 1 | 0 | _aPopular Autocrats |
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_aWashington DC : _bEditorial Office, _cJan./2009 |
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520 | 3 | _aThe popularity of incumbents can explain the resilience of authoritarian regimes in postcommunist Eurasia. Popular autocrats, in contrast to their unpopular counterparts, enjoy the support of the electorate and rarely have to resort to the use of brute force. Incumbents have at their disposal three strategies for ensuring popularity: economic populism, anti-Western nationalism, and muzzling the media. Cumulatively, these three strategies produce high levels of regime legitimacy and stability, and thwart the rise of a successful opposition movement. Broadly speaking, popular incumbents have managed to hold on to power in postcommunist Eurasia, while unpopular ones have eventually been unseated | |
773 | 0 | 8 |
_tJournal of Democracy _g20, 1, p. 78-81 _dWashington DC : Editorial Office, Jan./2009 _w |
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_a20170113 _b1029^b _cLarissa |
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_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c51216 _d51216 |
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041 | _aeng |