| 000 | nam a22 7a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 999 |
_c524325 _d524438 |
||
| 003 | BR-BrENAP | ||
| 005 | 20230405175426.0 | ||
| 008 | 230405b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 por d | ||
| 020 | _a9780262661317 | ||
| 040 |
_aBR-BrENAP _bPt_BR |
||
| 041 | _aeng | ||
| 090 |
_a338.9 _bP4679p |
||
| 100 | 1 |
_aPersson, Torsten _968085 |
|
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aPolitical economics : _bexplaining economic policy / _cpor Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. -- |
| 260 |
_aCambridge, _aMassachusetts : _bMIT Press, _c2000. |
||
| 300 |
_axix, 533 p. : _bil. |
||
| 504 | _aInclui bibliografia e índice. | ||
| 505 |
_t1 General Introduction _t1.1 Economic Policy _t1.2 Politics _t1.2 Politics _tI TOOLS OF POLITICAL ECONOMICS _t2 Preferences and Institutions _t2.1 A General Policy Problem _t2.2 Restricting Preferences _t2.3 Restricting Institutions _t2.4 Discussion _t2.5 Notes on the Literature _t2.6 Problems _t3 Electoral Competition _t3.1 A Simple Model of Public Finance _t3.2 Downsian Electoral Competition _t3.3 Median-Voter Equilibria _t3.4 Probabilistic Voting _t3.5 Lobbying _t3.6 Discussion _t3.7 Notes on the Literature _t3.8 Problems _t4 Agency _t4.1 Efficient Electoral Competition _t4.2 Inefficient Electoral Competition _t4.3 Enforceability, Verifiability, and Observability _t4.4 Electoral Accountability _t4.5 Career Concerns _t4.6 Discussion _t4.7 Notes on the Literature _t4.8 Problems _t5 Partisan Politicians _t5.1 Policy Convergence _t5.2 Policy Divergence _t5.3 Endogenous Candidates _t5.4 Legislative Bargaining _t5.5 Discussion _t5.6 Notes on the Literature _t5.7 Problems _tII REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS _t6 General-Interest Politics _t6.1 General Transfers _t6.2 Pensions _t6.3 Regional Transfers _t6.4 Unemployment Insurance _t6.5 Discussion _t6.6 Notes on the Literature _t6.7 Problems _t7 Special-Interest Politics _t7.1 A Model of Local Public Goods _t7.2 Legislative Bargaining _t7.3 Lobbying _t7.4 Electoral Competition _t7.5 Interactions _t7.6 Discussion _t7.7 Notes on the Literature _t7.8 Problems _tIII COMPARATIVE POLITICS _t8 Electoral Rules and Electoral Competition _t8.1 The Economic Model _t8.2 The Politics of Electoral Competition _t8.3 Single-District (Proportional) Elections _t8.4 Multiple-District (Majoritarian) Elections _t8.5 Broad versus Targeted Redistribution _t8.6 Discussion _t8.7 Notes on the Literature _t8.8 Problems _t9 Institutions and Accountability _t9.1 Electoral Rules and Career Concerns _t9.2 Electoral Rules and Accountability _t9.3 Separation of Powers _t9.4 Notes on the Literature _t9.5 Problems _t10 Political Regimes _t10.1 Policy Choices in a Simple Legislature _t10.2 Presidential-Congressional Regimes _t10.3 Parliamentary Regimes _t10.4 Discussion _t10.5 Notes on the Literature _t10.6 Problems _tIV DYNAMIC POLITICS _t11 Dynamic Policy Problems _t11.1 Analyzing Dynamic Policy Games _t11.2 Examples _t11.3 Discussion _t11.4 Notes on the Literature _t11.5 Problems _t12 Capital Taxation _t12.1 A Simple Model of Dynamic Taxation _t12.2 Credibility _t12.3 Politics _t12.4 Tax Competition _t12.5 Discussion _t12.6 Notes on the Literature _t12.7 Problems _t13 Public Debt _t13.1 A Simple Model of Public Debt _t13.2 The Dynamic Common-Pool Problem _t13.3 Political Instability _t13.4 Delayed Stabilizations _t13.5 Debt and Intergenerational Politics _t13.6 Discussion _t13.7 Notes on the Literature _t13.8 Problems _t14 Growth _t14.1 Income Inequality and Growth _t14.2 Political Instability and Growth _t14.3 Special Interests, Rents, and Growth _t14.4 Other Political Determinants of Growth _t14.5 Discussion _t14.6 Notes on the Literature _t14.7 Problems _tV MONETARY POLITICS _t15 Credibility of Monetary Policy _t15.1 A Simple Model of Monetary Policy _t15.2 Ex Ante Optimality _t15.3 Credibility _t15.4 Reputation _t15.5 Dynamics _t15.6 Notes on the Literature _t15.7 Problems _t16 Electoral Cycles _t16.1 Career Concerns and Political Business Cycles _t16.2 Partisan Cycles _t16.3 Notes on the Literature _t16.4 Problems _t17 Institutions and Incentives _t17.1 Simple Rules and Escape Clauses _t17.2 Central Bank Independence _t17.3 Inflation Targets and Contracts _t17.4 Notes on the Literature _t17.5 Problems _t18 International Policy Coordination _t18.1 A Simple Two-Country Model _t18.2 Incentives _t18.3 Institutions _t18.4 Discussion _t18.5 Notes on the Literature _t18.6 Problems _t19 What Next? _t19.1 Some Positive Ouestions _t19.2 Analytical Issues _t19.3 Concluding Remarks _tReferences _tAuthor Index _tSubiect Index |
||
| 520 | _aWhat determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions--the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science--Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems. | ||
| 650 | 0 | _aEconomic policy. | |
| 700 | 1 |
_aTabellini, Guido _968086 |
|
| 909 |
_a042023 _bVítor |
||
| 942 | _cG | ||