000			01928naa a2200181uu 4500
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003			OSt
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008			020910s2001 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSCHWARTZ, Robert _99702
245	1	0	_aManaging government-third sector colaboration : _baccountability, ambiguity, and politcs
260			_aNew York : _bMarcel Dekker, _c2001
520	3		_aRecent years have witnessed increased relevations by watch-dog agents of mismanagement and abuse in third sector organizations that collaborate whith government resulting in a decline in public trust and signs of a portending legitimacy crisis. Strengthening accountability mechanisms seems a obvius response to this trend. Yet, Israli attempts to improve accountability of government-third sector collaborations have largely failed. Politcs of accountability theory provides an explantion as to why. The findings demonstrate that political, bureaucratic and third sector stakeholders have a mutual interest in maintaining a cloak of ambiguity over government-third sector collaborations. The effects of four alternative accountability types on accountability, ambiguity, flexibility and politics are examined in a attempt to identify feasible and effective accountability strategies. There is no one ideal accountability tpe for all situations. Attention to the pitfalls of each accountability type may alert accountability decision-makers to appropriate combinations of accountability types for particular circumstances. However, the actual choice of accountability types has more to do with the polities of accountability than with scientific analysis of what is most appropriate
773	0	8	_tInternational Journal of Public Administration- IJPA _g24, 11, p. 1161-1188 _dNew York : Marcel Dekker, 2001 _xISSN 01900692 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020910 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20100521 _b0920^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c6906 _d6906
041			_aeng