000			01519naa a2200181uu 4500
001			6991
003			OSt
005			20190211154205.0
008			020917s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWHITFORD, Andrew B _911328
245	1	0	_aBureaucratic discretion, agency structure, and democratic responsiveness : _bthe case of the United States Attorneys
260			_c2002
520	3		_aStructural choices have fundamental and continuing effects on the democratic responsiveness of public agencies. In constrat to popular accounts of the United States Attorneys splendid isolation, I provide structural evidence of routes to the national political oversight of the prosecution of federal crimes in the field. I will examine U.S. Attorneys data on the prosecution of regulatory crimes and present statistical tests of local justice, lone justice, and overhead democratic control accounts of prosecutorial behavior. The U.S. Attorneys prosecution reflects local and internal office factors, but I also find a surprising degree of responsivness to national political trewnds, where this structure-induced responsiveness depends on the stage of the prosecutorial process. These results provide support for a design approach to understanding how public agencies respond to calls for democratic responsiveness
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory _g12, 1, p. 3-27 _d, 2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020917 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060508 _b1617^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7149 _d7149
041			_aeng