000			01801naa a2200205uu 4500
001			7051
003			OSt
005			20190211154211.0
008			020918s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aFEIOCK, Richard C _93417
245	1	0	_aEnvironmental protection versus economic development : _ba false trade-off?\
260			_aMalden, MA : _bBlackwell Publishers, _cmar./apr.2001
520	3		_aIs a trade-off between the social benefits of regulation and the economic benefits of development inevitable? We argue that environmental regulation may deter economic growth in some contexts, however, in other contexts the benefits of regulation may be obtained with little or no economic loss. We develop an explanation of the economic impacts of state environmental policy based on a model of public influence on private resource allocation decisions. In this model, we assume utility-maximizing firms will make investment choices based upon the projected profits on their investments and their willingness to accept the risk associate with the investments. We assert that state policies and administrative institutions influence perceptions of risk by increasing or decreasing uncertainty over future environmental policy and influence return on investments at particular locations by affecting firm-level production costs. Our results confirm that certain administrative arrangements for environmental regulation may enhance, rather than impede, economic development
590			_aPublic administration review PAR
700	1		_aSTREAM, Christopher _916608
773	0	8	_tPublic Administration Review: PAR _g61, 2, p. 313-321 _dMalden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, mar./apr.2001 _xISSN 00333352 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020918 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20090616 _b1238^b _cmayze
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7207 _d7207
041			_aeng