000			01654naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7076
003			OSt
005			20190211154213.0
008			020919s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aHIX, Simon _94836
245	1	0	_aConstitutional agenda-setting through discretion in rule interpretation : _bwhy the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam
260			_c2002
520	3		_aIt is a widely accepted that the 1990 Treaty of Amsterdam significantly increased the powers of the European Parliament (EP). The critical question, however, is why the European Union (EU) governments didi this. I argue, contrary to existing explanations, that these changes came about because the EP was a `constitutional agenda-setter'. The rules in the EU Treaty, as established at Maastricht, were incomplete contracts, and the EU governments had imperfect information about the precise operation of the Treaty. As a result, the EP was able to re-interpret these rules to its advantage and threaten not to co-operate with the governments unless they accepted the EP's interpretations. The article shows how this process of discretion, interpretation and acceptance worked in thetwo main areas of EP powwer: in the legislative process (in the refor of the co-decision procedure). The article concludes that `agenda-setting trough discretion in rule interpretatin' is a common story in the development of the powers of parliaments, both at the domestic and EU levels
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g32, 2, p. 259-280 _d, 2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020919 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060511 _b0938^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7232 _d7232
041			_aeng