000			01454naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7112
003			OSt
005			20190211154217.0
008			020920s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aFIRESTONE, Jeremy _93563
245	1	0	_aAgency governance and enforcement : _bthe influence of mission on environmental decisionmaking
260			_c2002
520	3		_aAdministrative agencies seeking to impose sanctions for regulatory violations can handle matters internally or through civil or criminal courts. Organizational culture, legal constraints, and political private actors may influence governance and hence choice of enforcement venue. An enforcement behavior model is constructed and tested empirically using a 1990-1997 sample of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) air, water and hazardous waste penalty cases involving individuals. While EPA's enforcenment arm embraces the mission of its regulatory arm-minimizing environmental harm - in part, it also has attributes of a police and prosecution force -specifically deterring (and maximizing social welfare) or incapacitating individual violators. Nevertheless, EPA may fail to minimize violations of and generally deter non-culpable individuals who are affiliated with large firms
773	0	8	_tJournal of Policy Analysis and Management _g21, 3, p. 409-426 _d, 2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020920 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060511 _b1458^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7268 _d7268
041			_aeng