000			01685naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7114
003			OSt
005			20190211154217.0
008			020920s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aLANGBEIN, Laura I _95861
245	1	0	_aResponsive bureaus, equity, and regulatory negotiation : _ban empirical view
260			_c2002
520	3		_aRulemaking agencies commonly delegate the implementation and enforcement of rules to affected parties, but they rarely delegate rulemaking authority. Regulatory negotiation is an example of this uncommon behavior. Compared to conventional rulemaking, regulatory negotiation is thought to be an attempt to make bureaucracy more responsive to affected stakeholders, especially when the rulemaking concerns politically complicated and technical issues. However, negotiation, while it may make bureaucrats more responsive, may also be less fair in that it is likely to result in relagively more responsiveness to interests supported by those with greather resources. This study presents empirical evidence that compares negotiated to conventional rulemaking processes at the Environmental Protection Agency in respect to both responsiveness and equality. The results uphold the expectation that negotiating rules appears more responsive than the conventional rule-writing process. Furthermore, the results show enequality in both processes; outcomes of negotiated rules may be more unequal than outcomes pf conventionally written rules
773	0	8	_tJournal of Policy Analysis and Management _g21, 3, p. 449-465 _d, 2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020920 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060511 _b1459^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7270 _d7270
041			_aeng