000			01439naa a2200193uu 4500
001			7137
003			OSt
005			20190211154219.0
008			020923s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSTASAVAGE, David _910317
245	1	0	_aWhen are monetary commitments credible? Parallel agreements and the sustainability of currency unions
260			_c2002
520	3		_aThis article investigates the conditions which make it costly for governments to renege on institutional commitments governing monetary policy. Focusing on one such type of commitment - monetary integration - we develop and test a hypothesis which suggests that the presence of parallel international agreements plays an important role in raising the cost of exit for states which might otherwise withdraw from a monetary union. While existing political economy work on credible commitmens in the are of monetary policy has had a heavy focus on countries in the European Union, we broaden the inquirity, using quantitative and qualitative evidence from the numerous African countries which have participated in monetary unions over the last forty years. Our results provide strong support for the parallel agreements hypothesis
700	1		_aEGUILLAUME, Dominique _916660
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g32, 1, p. 119-146 _d, 2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020923 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060511 _b1524^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7293 _d7293
041			_aeng