000			01689naa a2200193uu 4500
001			7139
003			OSt
005			20190211154220.0
008			020923s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMONTINOLA, Gabriella R _97383
245	1	0	_aSources of corruption : _ba cross-country study
260			_c2002
520	3		_aWhy is government corruption more pervasive in some societies than in others? In this article we examine public choice explanations that attribute corruption to a lack of competition in either political of economic arena or both. The principal part of our analysis draws on recently-published data about levels of corruption for a broad cross-section of countries reported for the early 1980s. We supplement this with an additional analysis of a second dataset on corruption measured during the late 1980s. Our analyses confirm that political competition affects level of corruption, but this effect is nonlinear. Corruption is typically lower in dictatorships than in countries that have partially democratized. But once past a threshold, democratic practices inhibit corruption. However, we obstained mixed results with respect to the relationship of economic competition and corruption: government size does not systematically affect corruption, but membership of the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) does. Finally, corruption is more pervasive in low-income countries which tend to underpay public sector employees
700	1		_aJACKMAN, Robert W _916661
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g32, 1, p. 147-170 _d, 2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020923 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060511 _b1526^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7295 _d7295
041			_aeng