000			01672naa a2200193uu 4500
001			7236
003			OSt
005			20190211154230.0
008			020925s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aTETLOCK, Philip E _910603
245	1	0	_aPoking counterfactual holes in covering lwas : _bcogninitive styles and historical reasoning
260			_c2001
520	3		_aWe report a series of studies of historical reasoning among professional observers of world politics. The correlational studies demonstrate that experts with strong theoretical commitments to a covering law and cognitive-stylistic preferences for explanatory closure are more likely to reject close-call counterfactuals that imply that "already explained" historical outcomes could easily have taken radically different forms. The experimental studies suggest that counterfactual reasoning is not totally theory-driven: many experts are capable of surprisin themselve when encourage to imagne the implications of particular what-if scnearios. Yet, there is a downside to openness to historical contigency. The more effort expert allocate to exploring counterfactual worlds, the greater is the risk that they will assign too much subjective probability to too many scenarios. We close by defining good judgment as a reflective-equilibrium process of balancing the conficting causual intuition primed by complementary factual and counterfactual posings of historical quetions
700	1		_aLEBOW, Richard Ned _95952
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g95, 4, p. 829-844 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020925 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060512 _b1204^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7390 _d7390
041			_aeng