000			01432naa a2200193uu 4500
001			7238
003			OSt
005			20190211154231.0
008			020925s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMOENE, Karl Ove _97309
245	1	0	_aInequality ,social insurance, and redistribution
260			_c2001
520	3		_aIs the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less efalitarian societies? We answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner. When voters have both redistribuytive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending, the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are target. Greate inquality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those withour earnings. With endogenaous targeting, support for benefits to those without earning declines as inquality increases, whereas support for agregate spending is a V-shaped function of inequality. Statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrional societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model
700	1		_aWALLERSTEIN, Michael _916743
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g95, 4, p. 859-874 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020925 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060512 _b1459^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7392 _d7392
041			_aeng