000			01350naa a2200193uu 4500
001			7262
003			OSt
005			20190211154233.0
008			020925s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWASSENAAR, Mattheus C _911196
245	1	0	_aLocal fiscal strategies in the Netherlands : _ban empirical analysis
260			_c2002
520	3		_aOne of the most importante possible sources of conflict of interest between central and local governments is difference in political preferences with respect to, for example, income redistribution. If local governments are of a different political composition than the central government, they may be inclined to reinforce or weaken the redistribution policies as ursued by central government. We empirically test whether local governments in the Netherlands do pursue income redistribution policies over and above the central government's redistribution policy and we find that the central government's redistribution policy and we find that the distribution of the local tax burden over the various household types differs according to the political composition of the local council
700	1		_aVAN SOEST, Daan P _916754
773	0	8	_tLocal Government Studies _g28, 2, p. 88-100 _d, 2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020925 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060515 _b1023^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7415 _d7415
041			_aeng