000			01306naa a2200193uu 4500
001			7297
003			OSt
005			20200812114130.0
008			020926s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aACEMOGLU, Daron _916768
245	1	0	_aInefficient redistribution
260			_c2001
520	3		_aThere are many well-developed theories that explain why governments redistribute income, but very few can explain why this often is done in a socially ineffienct form. In the theory we develop, compared to efficient methods, inefficient redistribution makes it more attractive to stay in or enter a group that receives subsidies. When political institutions cannot credibly commint to future policy, and when the political influence of a group depends on its size, inefficient redistribution is a toll to sustain political power. Our model may account for the choice of inefficient redistributive policies in agriculture, trade, and the labor market. It also implies that when factors of production are less specific to a sector, inefficient redistribution may be more prevalent
700	1		_916769 _aRobinson, James A.
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g95, 3, p. 649-662 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020926 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060515 _b1039^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7450 _d7450
041			_aeng