000			01205naa a2200205uu 4500
001			7306
003			OSt
005			20230314161631.0
008			020926s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_96900 _aMcCarty, Nolan
245	1	0	_aThe hunt for party discipline in congress
260			_c2001
520	3		_aWe analyze party discipline in the House of Representatives between 1947 and 1998. The effects of party pressures can be represented in a spatial model by allowing each party to have its own cutting line on roll call votes. Adding a second cutting line makes, at best, a marginal improvement over the standard single-line model. Analysis of legislators who switch parties shows, however, that party discipline is manifest in the location of the legislator`s ideal point. In contrast to our approach, we find that the Snyder-groseclose method of estimating the influence of party discipline is biased toward exaggerating party effects
700	1		_aPOOLE, Keith T _98545
700	1		_aROSENTHAL, Howard _916774
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g95, 3, p. 673-688 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020926 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060515 _b1042^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7459 _d7459
041			_aeng