000			01550naa a2200193uu 4500
001			7331
003			OSt
005			20230314161631.0
008			020927s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aHUBER, John D _94957
245	1	0	_aCabinet decision rules and political uncertainty in parliamentary bargaining
260			_c2001
520	3		_aWe investigate how cabinet dicision-making rules interact with political uncertainty to affect the outcomes of bargaining processes in parliamentary systems. Our formal models compare two types of decision rules: (1) those that require prime ministers to obtain collective cabinet approval for confidence motions. We examine these models under assumptions of complete information and of political uncertainty, that is, party leaders lack information about the precise policies that others in the governning coalition will support. Our analysis suggests that the nature of the cabinet decision rules should influence the distribution of bargaining power, the ability to exploit political uncertainty, the likelihood of inefficient government terminations, the circumstances surrounding such failures, and, indirectly, the political considerations that parties face when choosing prime ministers during government foramation. Simple empirical tests support some of these insights
700	1		_96900 _aMcCarty, Nolan
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g95, 2, p. 345-360 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020927 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20070102 _b1510^b _cNatália
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7484 _d7484
041			_aeng