000			01403naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7332
003			OSt
005			20190211154240.0
008			020927s2005 xx ||||g| |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMARTIN, Andrew D _96716
245	1	0	_aCongressional decision making and the separation of powers
260			_c2001
520	3		_aTo what extent does the separation of powers affect congerssional roll call voting behavior? To answer this question, I offer a strategic model of congressinal decision making that asserts members of Congress pursue public policy goals when casting roll call votes. From the equilibrium prediction of a formal model, I generate testable hypotheses by computing the expected net amount of shophisticated (nonsincere) congressional behavior given changes in decision context. I text the predictions of the theoretical model with data from all civil rights roll call votes from the 83d to the 102d Congress. The results demonstrate that both the other legislative chamber and the Supreme Court profoundly constrain House members and senators when casting roll call votes. This is strong evidence of the importance of policy outcomes to members of Congress when voting on the floor
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g95, 2, p. 361-378 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020927 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060515 _b1418^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7485 _d7485
041			_aeng