000			01680naa a2200205uu 4500
001			7365
003			OSt
005			20190211154244.0
008			020927s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBOHNET, Iris _91249
245	1	0	_aMore order with less law : _bon contract enforcement, trust, and crowding
260			_c2001
520	3		_aMost contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. "More law" it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. We examine a contractual relationship in which the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze how contract enforceability affects individual performance for exogenous preferences. Then we apply a dynamic model of preferece adaptation and find that economic icentives have a nomonotonic effect on behavior. Individuals perform a contract when enforcement if strong or weak bytnot with medium enforcment probabilities: trustworthiness is "crowded in" with weak and "crowded out" with medium enforcment. In a laboratory experiment we test oru model`s implication an find support for the crowding predication. Our finding is in line with the recent work on the role of contract enforcement and trast in formley Communist coutries
700	1		_aFREY, Bruno S _916874
700	1		_aHUCK, Steffen _916875
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g95, 1, p. 131-145 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020927 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060515 _b1515^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7518 _d7518
041			_aeng