000			01786naa a2200181uu 4500
001			7380
003			OSt
005			20190211154245.0
008			020930s2001 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aKOEHLER, Dadid _95652
245	1	0	_aConvergence and restricted preference maximizing under simple committee choice in two-dimensional space
260			_c2001
520	3		_aRecent analyses of collective choice predit convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. I estimate the extent of convergence under restricted preference maximizing through a computer simulation of majority choice by committees in which individual decision on proposal location and voting are constrained. The simulation generates distributions of majority-adopted proposals in two-dimensional space: nondeterministic outcomes of simple-majority choice. The proposal distributions provide data for a quantitative evaluation of the effects on convergence of realxing conventional preference-maiximizing assumptions. I find convergence of majority-adopted proposals in all cases, and that convergence increases under restricted proposal location. Moreover, under some voting restrictions, experiments yield stable outcomes that demonstrate remarkable convergence. I conclude that resticted preference maiximizing generally increases the probability that simple-majority outcomes reflect the central tendency of member preference distributions. Since committees and legislatures are important formal procedures for democratic collective choice, this conclusion applies to a large class of political decisions
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g95, 1, p. 155-168 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20020930 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060831 _b1723^b _cElda
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c7533 _d7533
041			_aeng