000			01751naa a2200265uu 4500
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003			OSt
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008			021111s2001 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aABBOTT, Kenneth, W _917226
245	1	0	_aInternational "standards"and international governance
260			_c2001
520	3		_a"Standards" are central mechanisms of international governance, but have different roles in various circumstances. These can be analyzed in terms of a simple typology. One key distinction is analytic: constrasting the Prisoners Dilemma structure of traditional Pigovian externalities with the Coordination struture of network externalities. The second distinction is substantive: contransting physical or technological externalities with externalities that arise in the creation of public policy. The four resulting circumstances are typically addressed by alternative governance arrangements: varying combinations of private and public governance - accroding to the rspective interests and competencies of the two spheres - and varying levels of governance - national, regional of global - according to the scope of the problem and the capacity of institutioions. Our analysis of these choices is equally useful for addressing the ssociated normative question - how should international standards be set?
650		4	_aExternality _912418
650		4	_aGovernance _912406
650		4	_aInstitutional Analysis _917227
650		4	_aInternational Law _917228
650		4	_aPrivate Rule-Making _917229
650		4	_aStandards _917230
700	1		_aSNIDAL, Duncan _917231
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g8, 3, p. 345-370 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021111 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20100623 _b1654^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c8364 _d8364
041			_aeng