000			01652naa a2200229uu 4500
001			8219
003			OSt
005			20190211154415.0
008			021111s2001 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSPRUYT, Hendrik _910296
245	1	0	_aThe supply and demand of governance in standard-setting : _binsights from the past
260			_c2001
520	3		_aGovernance in standard-setting can be distinguished in the degree of public or private oversith, and i the degree to which the environment is hierarchical or narchical. This variation in governance structures can be explained ty three vairables; (1) the gains that flow to politial entrepreneurs in supplying state intervention; (2) the strategic setting in which private and public actors operate;and (3) the intrinsic attributes of the good in questions. The article argues tahta while private demand is an important facet of standards governance, greater attention needs to be paid to the incentives for political entrepreneurs to supply public intervention, and the incentives for political entrepreneurs to agree on commom standards. A historical analysis of product standards and transactional standards, as wights and measures, reveals that public actors may impede satandardization even in the face of high private demand and clear public welfare gains
650		4	_aCoinage _917235
650		4	_aCoordination Game _917236
650		4	_aPrisioner`s Dilemma _912419
650		4	_aStandards, Weight and Measures _917237
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g8, 3, p. 371-391 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021111 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20100623 _b1656^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c8366 _d8366
041			_aeng