000			01963naa a2200253uu 4500
001			8229
003			OSt
005			20190211154416.0
008			021112s2001 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aLAZER, David _95933
245	1	0	_aRegulatory interdependence and international governance
260			_c2001
520	3		_aThe objective of this paper is thereefold: First is to produce a broad framework of the ways that state regulatory policies are interdependent. Second is to examine the factors that determine the nature of that interdependence. Third is to discuss the governance implications of different types of regulatory interdependencies. This analysis is applied to the spread of a new international fish inspection regulatory regime. I propose three modes of regulatory interdependence competitive, coordinative, and informational. The key assumption in the competitive mode of regulatory interdependence is that states are caught in a prisoner`s delemma - either because states use social regulation as a protectionist tool or because states undercut each other`s regulations in a race to the bottom. In the coordenative mode of interdepence it is assumed that there are certain benefits to having regulations that are compatible with those of other states - sometimes resulting in a race togher, or a race to the top. Finally, in the informational mode of interdependence, it is assumed that states are coping with massive uncertainty as to their best policy options. The regulatory choices of other states provide signals (and often much data) to good policy options
650		4	_aExternality _912418
650		4	_aGovernance _912406
650		4	_aInstitutional Analysis _917227
650		4	_aInternational Law _917228
650		4	_aRegulations _917251
650		4	_aStandards _917230
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g8, 3, p. 474-492 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021112 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20100623 _b1700^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c8376 _d8376
041			_aeng