000			01928naa a2200241uu 4500
001			8232
003			OSt
005			20190211154416.0
008			021112s2001 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSMITH, Mitchell _910125
245	1	0	_aIn pursuit of selective liberalization : _bsingle market competition and its limits
260			_cAugust 2001
520	3		_aWithin Europe`s single market, private sector firms and business associations have sought to use EC competition rules to broaden competition in a range of public sector ativities. Has capital`s ability to pursue its interests at multiple levels within the European polity rendered national governments less able to define the timing, scope, and extent of economic liberalization? When and how can governments exercise political regulation of markets in the face of potent liberalizing forces? The article draws on evidence from three areas in which European Community institutions have articulated a clear logic of liberalization and private sector actors have appealed to single market competition rules to broaden market access. In each area - the procurement of goods and services by public authorities, the German banking sector, and postal services - private sector actors have succeeded in legal proceedings against government practices that restrict competition. However, the study finds that the parameters of liberalization ultimately depend on the selective incentives faced by private sector actors, the needs of domestic political institutions , and the intensity of government preferences
650		4	_aCompetition Policy _912412
650		4	_aLiberalization _917258
650		4	_aPolitical Regulation _917259
650		4	_aPublic Services _917260
650		4	_aSingle Market _917261
773	0	8	_tJournal of European Public Policy _g8, 4, p. 519-540 _d, August 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021112 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20100623 _b1634^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c8379 _d8379
041			_aeng