000			01363naa a2200205uu 4500
001			8402
003			OSt
005			20190211154444.0
008			021119s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aROBINS, Philip K _99050
245	1	0	_aFinancial Incentives and welfare reform in the United States
260			_c2001
520	3		_aThis paper uses a microsimulation model to ask whether welfare recipients in the United States would work, full-time if offered an earnings suupplement that was conditioned on ful-time employment. The simulations suggest that the earnings supplement would increase full-time employment, with little additional cash transfer cost to the government. In contrast, financial incentives currently being used by many of the states are increasing employment and income, but are encouraging primarily part-time employment. Encouraging full-time employment is particularly important in light of new time limits on welfare receipt. Faced with a loss of welfare benefits, many recipients may find that part-time earnings do not allow them to be economically self-suficient
700	1		_aMICHALOPOULOS, Charles _917690
700	1		_aPAN, Elsie _917691
773	0	8	_tJournal of Policy Analysis and Management _g20, 1, p. 129-149 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021119 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060613 _b1232^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c8548 _d8548
041			_aeng