000			01519naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8411
003			OSt
005			20190211154446.0
008			021119s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDELMAS, Magali _92827
245	1	0	_aGovernment credible commitment to the French and American Nuclear Power Industries
260			_c2001
520	3		_aBacklash against nuclear power, although widespread, affected nuclear power programs differently in the United States than in France owing to their differing institutional setups. This article uses a transaction costs economics approach to examine government credible commitment to the French and American nuclear power industries. Positive political theory sends light on the comparative institutional environment in each industry. The American combination of gramented power, little reliance on bureaucratic expertise, an independent judiciary, and opposing interest groups greatly undermines the ability of the U.S. government to credibly commit to the nuclear power industry. In France, despite substantial anti-nuclear interest groups, the impermeability of the institutuional setup - no division of power, weak judiciary, and reliance on bureaucratic expertise - effectively prevents activists from influencing policy outcomes
700	1		_aHEIMAN, Bruce _917697
773	0	8	_tJournal of Policy Analysis and Management _g20, 3, p. 433-456 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021119 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060614 _b1556^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c8557 _d8557
041			_aeng