000			02279naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8622
003			OSt
005			20190211154516.0
008			021125s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
245	1	0	_aLegislative procedures in the European Union : _ban empirical analysis
260			_c2001
520	3		_aThis article analyses the roel of the commission, the Parliamente, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union:co-operation and co-decision(I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendements. These procedures have been the subject of agreat deal of theoretical debate. According to coventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the pwers of the European Parliament. Revisionist approaches, however, suggest that the conditional agenda-setting powers accorded to the Parliament by the co-operation procedure are more important than the veto powers ascribed by co-decision. Our analysis demonstrates not only that both claims are correct, but also why. On the aggregate there is a higher success rate or parliamentary amendements under co-decision (I) thatn under co-operation, just as the data published by the EP indicate. However, controlling for one of the conditions of conditional agenda setting (agreement by the commision under co-operation), conditional agenda setting empowers the EP more than veto powers. Finally, control of Commission behaviour in both procedures indicates no difference in acceptance rates between co-operation and co-decision. Our analysis explains why all three points above are true. The answer hinges on the activity of the Commission, which was more hostile to parliamentary amendments during the 1989-94 period (more amendments were rejected during this period than during any other period under both co-operation and co-decision). In addition, the power of the Commission has declined under co-decision (because it can be and is more frequently overruled by the other two players, whether its opinion is positive or negative)
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g31, 4, p. 573-599 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021125 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060621 _b1713^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c8767 _d8767
700			_a
041			_aeng