000			01929naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8627
003			OSt
005			20190211154517.0
008			021125s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aWARWICK, Paul V _911194
245	1	0	_aPorfolio Salience and the proportionality of payoffs in Coalition Governments
260			_c2001
520	3		_aA fundamental divide has emerged over how portfolio payoffs are distributed among parties in paliamentary coalition. On one side lies very strong empirical evidence that the parties in a governing coalition tend to receive profolios in one-to-one proportion to ghe amount of legislative support they contribute to the coalition, with pwerhaps some slight deviations from proportionality coming at the expense of larger parties that lead coalition negotiations. On the other side of the debate lies a straem of formal theories that suggests the opposite - that parties in charge of coalition negotiations ought to be able to tak a disproportiantely large share of porfolio benefits for temselves. In this artile, we address this disjuncture by re-examining the empirical connection between legislative seats and portfolio payoffs with the aid of a new and more extensive dataset, a different method of analysis, and what we see as a more valid operationalization of the dependent variable. This operationalization involves the inclusion, for the first time, of evidence concerning the importance or salience of the portfolios each party receives, as opposed to just their quantity. The article concludes with an assessment of the implications of ouw findings for the debate over the rewards of coalition membership in parliamentary democracies
700	1		_aDRUCKMAN, James N _917960
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g31, 4, p. 627-649 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021125 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060623 _b1153^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c8772 _d8772
041			_aeng