000			01642naa a2200181uu 4500
001			8632
003			OSt
005			20190211154517.0
008			021126s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
245	1	0	_aPolitical institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders
260			_c2002
520	3		_aInstitutional arrangements influence the type of policies that leaders pursue. We examine two institutional variables: size of the selectorate (S) - the set of people who have an instituional sa in choosing leaders - and the size of the winning coalition (W) - the minimal set of people whose support the incumbent needs in order to their small group of supporters at the expense of the provision of public goods. The size of the selectorate, influences how hard leardes work on behalf of their supporters. The greater the size of the selectorate, the more current supporters fear exclusion from future coalitions. This induces a norm of loyalty that enables leaders to reduce their effort and still survive. As a first step towards a theory of endogenous selection of institutions, we characterize the institutional preferences of the different segments of society based on the consequences of these institutions for individual welfare. We conclude by examining the implication of the model for the tenure of leaders, public policy, economic growth, corruption, taxation and ethnic politics
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g32, 4, p. 559-590 _d, 2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021126 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060623 _b1553^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c8777 _d8777
700			_a
041			_aeng