000			01684naa a2200205uu 4500
001			8638
003			OSt
005			20190211154518.0
008			021126s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aORBELL, John _97975
245	1	0	_aThe evolution of political intelligence : _bsimulation results
260			_c2002
520	3		_aSeveral bodies of theory develop the idea that the intelligence of highly social animals - most interestingly, human - is significantly organized aroun the adaptive problems posed by their sociality. By this `political intelligence" hypothesis, sociality selects for, among other attributes, capacities for `manipulating' information others can gather about one's own future behaviour, and for `mindreading' such manipulations by others. Yet we have little theory about how diverse parameters of the games that social animal play select for political intelligence. We begin to address that with an evolutionary simulation n which agents choose between playing Prisioner's Dilemma and Hawk - dove games on the basis of the information they can retrieve about each other given four broad information processing capacities. We show that political intelligence - operationally, the aggregate of those four capacities - evolves to its highest levels when co-operative games are generally more attractive than conflictual ones, but when conflictual games are at least sometimes also attractive
700	1		_aMORIKAWA, Tomonori _917965
700	1		_aALLEN, Nicholas _917966
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g32, 4, p. 613-639 _d, 2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021126 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060626 _b1427^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c8783 _d8783
041			_aeng