000			01444naa a2200193uu 4500
001			8646
003			OSt
005			20190211154520.0
008			021126s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aTREISMAN, Daniel _910778
245	1	0	_aPolitical business cycles and Russian elections, or the manipulations of "Chudar"
260			_c2001
520	3		_aPolitical business cycle theories tend to focus on one policy instrument or macroeconomic lever at a time. Efforts to find empirical evidence of oportunistic business cycles have turned up rather meagre results. We suggest that these facts may be related. If ways of manipulating the economy to win votes are thought of as substitues, with changing relative costs, one would expect rational policy makers to switch between them in different periods as costs change. We illustrate this argument with a discussion of Russia. In Russia, four nationwide votes have been held sice 1993. We deduce the set of policies that a rational, behind-the-scenes strategist - the "Chudar" of the title - would recommend to an incumbent who believes the voters to vote retrospecttively. We show that the expectations are borne out closely in the actual macroeconomic data
700	1		_aGIMPELSON, Vladimir _917970
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g31, 2, p. 225-246 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021126 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060626 _b1437^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c8791 _d8791
041			_aeng