000			01460naa a2200193uu 4500
001			9123
003			OSt
005			20190211154630.0
008			021210s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMARTIN, Steve _96724
245	1	0	_aWhat works and for whom? the competing rationalities of `Best Value`
260			_c2001
520	3		_aThis article argues that the UK Best Value regimen is rooted in `rational` model of strategic planning that privileges performance management and external inspection and implicity denigrades traditional forms of representative democracy. This poses important questions about how and by whom Best Value is to be defined. Central government has stressed tha need for political leadership of and public involvement in Best Value. However, the regime suggests a managerial role for elected members that many councillors find unattractive. Current reforms also assume a much greater degree of public engagement than many authorities are achieving. As a result, key decisions about local public service provision may increasingly be driven by centrally determined priorities and the judgements of external inspectors whose local accountability is unclear and whose claim to superior technical knowledge remains unproven
700	1		_aDAVIS, Howard _92754
773	0	8	_tPolicy & Politic _g29, 4, p. 465-475 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20021210 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20111025 _b1617^b _cGeisneer
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c9264 _d9264
041			_aeng