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003 OSt
005 20190211154732.0
008 021218s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100 1 _aWOLFE, Barbara L
_911418
245 1 0 _aIncentives, challenges, and dilemmas of TANF :
_ba case study
260 _c2002
520 3 _aThis paper compares the incentives inherent in TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), the U.S. welfare system in place after the 1996 reforms, with those of TANF's predecessor, AFDC (Aid to Families with dependent Children), using the experience in one state. Wisconsin, as an example. Is the new program successful in avoiding the "poverty trap" of the old welfare system, in which the marginal tax rates imposed on earnings and benefits were so high that they discouraged work effort outside a narrow earnings range? As women receiving assistance begin working more hours and eaning more, income-conditioned benefits (Food Stamps, EITC, Medicaid, and subsidies for child care) are reduced and withdrawn, in effect constituting a "tax" on earnings. Under TANF, there is more support for these families, at least in Wisconsin, and so economic well-being should be higher for most women with earning in this range than it was under AFDC. But marginal tax rates under TANF remain high, and in some income ranges they are higher than under AFDC. Once in the work force, former TANF recipients have earnings over the long run that expose them to very high marginal tax rates, which decrease the benefits of working harder and make it very difficult to gain full economic independence. Evidence from other sources suggest that most low-skilled women have earnings in the same range and so are likely to face similar reductions in benefits such as child care subsidies or the EITC as their earning increase, even if they are not receiving welfare-related benefits
773 0 8 _tJournal of Policy Analysis and Management
_g19, 4, p. 577-586
_d, 2002
_w
942 _cS
998 _a20021218
_bLucima
_cLucimara
998 _a20060529
_b1638^b
_cQuiteria
999 _aConvertido do Formato PHL
_bPHL2MARC21 1.1
_c9640
_d9640
041 _aeng