MOLINARI, M. Christina
Military capabilities and escalation : a correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick - 2000
Bueno de Mesquita , Morrow, and Zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two-sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict. I show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions, and I offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games
Military capabilities and escalation : a correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick - 2000
Bueno de Mesquita , Morrow, and Zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two-sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict. I show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions, and I offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games
