SAINT-MARTIN, Denis
Managerialist advocate or "control freak"? : the Janus-faced office of the auditor general - Toronto : IPAC, Summer 2004
This article highlights the contradictions in the role of the Office of Auditor General (OAG) and identifies the sources as well as the consequences of the offices Janus-like character as both a managerialist advocate and control freak. This character, it is argued, is shaped by institutional factors and the knowledge-basis on which the office relies to fulfil its mission. Three causes of institutional schizophrenia are identified: the OAGs mandate in relation to financial and value-for-money audit (VFMA); the combination of the OAGs institutional permeability and the structure of the management consulting market; and the tensions between the negative and positive dimensions of the offices mandate. On the consequences side, the author discusses three elements: the limited capacity of the OAG to develop a coherent position about managerialism; the fact that the advocacy of managerialist principles is drawing the OAG closer into the political realm; and the fragility of professionalism as a mechanism for regulating the management consultants role of the OAG in relation to VFMA
Managerialist advocate or "control freak"? : the Janus-faced office of the auditor general - Toronto : IPAC, Summer 2004
This article highlights the contradictions in the role of the Office of Auditor General (OAG) and identifies the sources as well as the consequences of the offices Janus-like character as both a managerialist advocate and control freak. This character, it is argued, is shaped by institutional factors and the knowledge-basis on which the office relies to fulfil its mission. Three causes of institutional schizophrenia are identified: the OAGs mandate in relation to financial and value-for-money audit (VFMA); the combination of the OAGs institutional permeability and the structure of the management consulting market; and the tensions between the negative and positive dimensions of the offices mandate. On the consequences side, the author discusses three elements: the limited capacity of the OAG to develop a coherent position about managerialism; the fact that the advocacy of managerialist principles is drawing the OAG closer into the political realm; and the fragility of professionalism as a mechanism for regulating the management consultants role of the OAG in relation to VFMA
