DOLAN, Julie
The budget-minimizing bureaucrat? Empirical evidence from the senior executive service - Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, jan./feb.2002
In a representative democracy, we assume the populace exerts some control over the actions an outputs of government officials, ensuring they comport with public preferences. However, the growth of the fourt branch of government has created a paradox: unelected bureaucrats now have the power to affect government decisions(Meier 1993; Rourke 1984; Aberbach, Putnan and Rockman 1981). This article, i rely on two competing theories of bureaucratic behavior - representative-bureaucracy theory and Niskanen's budget-maximization theory-to assess how well the top ranks on the federal government represent the demands of the citizenry. Focusing on federal-speding priorities, I assess whether Senior Executive Service (SES) members mirror the attitudes of the populace or are likely to inflate budgets for their own personal gain. Contrary to the popular portrayal of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat (Niskanen 1971), I find these federal administrators prefer less speding than the public on most broad spending categories, even on issues that fall within their own departament's jurisdictions. As such, it may be time to revise our theories about bureaucratic self-interest and spending priorities
The budget-minimizing bureaucrat? Empirical evidence from the senior executive service - Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, jan./feb.2002
In a representative democracy, we assume the populace exerts some control over the actions an outputs of government officials, ensuring they comport with public preferences. However, the growth of the fourt branch of government has created a paradox: unelected bureaucrats now have the power to affect government decisions(Meier 1993; Rourke 1984; Aberbach, Putnan and Rockman 1981). This article, i rely on two competing theories of bureaucratic behavior - representative-bureaucracy theory and Niskanen's budget-maximization theory-to assess how well the top ranks on the federal government represent the demands of the citizenry. Focusing on federal-speding priorities, I assess whether Senior Executive Service (SES) members mirror the attitudes of the populace or are likely to inflate budgets for their own personal gain. Contrary to the popular portrayal of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat (Niskanen 1971), I find these federal administrators prefer less speding than the public on most broad spending categories, even on issues that fall within their own departament's jurisdictions. As such, it may be time to revise our theories about bureaucratic self-interest and spending priorities
