| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01953naa a2200205uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
|---|
| control field |
6859 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20190211154153.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
020912s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] |
PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
|---|
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
DOLAN, Julie |
| 9 (RLIN) |
2979 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
The budget-minimizing bureaucrat? Empirical evidence from the senior executive service |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. |
Malden, MA : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
Blackwell Publishers, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
jan./feb.2002 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
In a representative democracy, we assume the populace exerts some control over the actions an outputs of government officials, ensuring they comport with public preferences. However, the growth of the fourt branch of government has created a paradox: unelected bureaucrats now have the power to affect government decisions(Meier 1993; Rourke 1984; Aberbach, Putnan and Rockman 1981). This article, i rely on two competing theories of bureaucratic behavior - representative-bureaucracy theory and Niskanen's budget-maximization theory-to assess how well the top ranks on the federal government represent the demands of the citizenry. Focusing on federal-speding priorities, I assess whether Senior Executive Service (SES) members mirror the attitudes of the populace or are likely to inflate budgets for their own personal gain. Contrary to the popular portrayal of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat (Niskanen 1971), I find these federal administrators prefer less speding than the public on most broad spending categories, even on issues that fall within their own departament's jurisdictions. As such, it may be time to revise our theories about bureaucratic self-interest and spending priorities |
| 590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN) |
|---|
| Local note |
Public administration review PAR |
| 590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN) |
|---|
| Local note |
January/February 2002 Volume 62 Number 1 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Title |
Public Administration Review: PAR |
| Related parts |
62, 1, p. 42-50 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication |
Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, jan./feb.2002 |
| International Standard Serial Number |
ISSN 00333352 |
| Record control number |
|
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha item type |
Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20020912 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
Lucima |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Lucimara |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20090616 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
1614^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
mayze |
