KOEHLER, Dadid
Convergence and restricted preference maximizing under simple committee choice in two-dimensional space - 2001
Recent analyses of collective choice predit convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. I estimate the extent of convergence under restricted preference maximizing through a computer simulation of majority choice by committees in which individual decision on proposal location and voting are constrained. The simulation generates distributions of majority-adopted proposals in two-dimensional space: nondeterministic outcomes of simple-majority choice. The proposal distributions provide data for a quantitative evaluation of the effects on convergence of realxing conventional preference-maiximizing assumptions. I find convergence of majority-adopted proposals in all cases, and that convergence increases under restricted proposal location. Moreover, under some voting restrictions, experiments yield stable outcomes that demonstrate remarkable convergence. I conclude that resticted preference maiximizing generally increases the probability that simple-majority outcomes reflect the central tendency of member preference distributions. Since committees and legislatures are important formal procedures for democratic collective choice, this conclusion applies to a large class of political decisions
Convergence and restricted preference maximizing under simple committee choice in two-dimensional space - 2001
Recent analyses of collective choice predit convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. I estimate the extent of convergence under restricted preference maximizing through a computer simulation of majority choice by committees in which individual decision on proposal location and voting are constrained. The simulation generates distributions of majority-adopted proposals in two-dimensional space: nondeterministic outcomes of simple-majority choice. The proposal distributions provide data for a quantitative evaluation of the effects on convergence of realxing conventional preference-maiximizing assumptions. I find convergence of majority-adopted proposals in all cases, and that convergence increases under restricted proposal location. Moreover, under some voting restrictions, experiments yield stable outcomes that demonstrate remarkable convergence. I conclude that resticted preference maiximizing generally increases the probability that simple-majority outcomes reflect the central tendency of member preference distributions. Since committees and legislatures are important formal procedures for democratic collective choice, this conclusion applies to a large class of political decisions
