Convergence and restricted preference maximizing under simple committee choice in two-dimensional space
By: KOEHLER, Dadid
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2001American Political Science Review 95, 1, p. 155-168Abstract: Recent analyses of collective choice predit convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. I estimate the extent of convergence under restricted preference maximizing through a computer simulation of majority choice by committees in which individual decision on proposal location and voting are constrained. The simulation generates distributions of majority-adopted proposals in two-dimensional space: nondeterministic outcomes of simple-majority choice. The proposal distributions provide data for a quantitative evaluation of the effects on convergence of realxing conventional preference-maiximizing assumptions. I find convergence of majority-adopted proposals in all cases, and that convergence increases under restricted proposal location. Moreover, under some voting restrictions, experiments yield stable outcomes that demonstrate remarkable convergence. I conclude that resticted preference maiximizing generally increases the probability that simple-majority outcomes reflect the central tendency of member preference distributions. Since committees and legislatures are important formal procedures for democratic collective choice, this conclusion applies to a large class of political decisions
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Recent analyses of collective choice predit convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. I estimate the extent of convergence under restricted preference maximizing through a computer simulation of majority choice by committees in which individual decision on proposal location and voting are constrained. The simulation generates distributions of majority-adopted proposals in two-dimensional space: nondeterministic outcomes of simple-majority choice. The proposal distributions provide data for a quantitative evaluation of the effects on convergence of realxing conventional preference-maiximizing assumptions. I find convergence of majority-adopted proposals in all cases, and that convergence increases under restricted proposal location. Moreover, under some voting restrictions, experiments yield stable outcomes that demonstrate remarkable convergence. I conclude that resticted preference maiximizing generally increases the probability that simple-majority outcomes reflect the central tendency of member preference distributions. Since committees and legislatures are important formal procedures for democratic collective choice, this conclusion applies to a large class of political decisions
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