Legislative procedures in the European Union : an empirical analysis
- 2001
This article analyses the roel of the commission, the Parliamente, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union:co-operation and co-decision(I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendements. These procedures have been the subject of agreat deal of theoretical debate. According to coventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the pwers of the European Parliament. Revisionist approaches, however, suggest that the conditional agenda-setting powers accorded to the Parliament by the co-operation procedure are more important than the veto powers ascribed by co-decision. Our analysis demonstrates not only that both claims are correct, but also why. On the aggregate there is a higher success rate or parliamentary amendements under co-decision (I) thatn under co-operation, just as the data published by the EP indicate. However, controlling for one of the conditions of conditional agenda setting (agreement by the commision under co-operation), conditional agenda setting empowers the EP more than veto powers. Finally, control of Commission behaviour in both procedures indicates no difference in acceptance rates between co-operation and co-decision. Our analysis explains why all three points above are true. The answer hinges on the activity of the Commission, which was more hostile to parliamentary amendments during the 1989-94 period (more amendments were rejected during this period than during any other period under both co-operation and co-decision). In addition, the power of the Commission has declined under co-decision (because it can be and is more frequently overruled by the other two players, whether its opinion is positive or negative)
This article analyses the roel of the commission, the Parliamente, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union:co-operation and co-decision(I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendements. These procedures have been the subject of agreat deal of theoretical debate. According to coventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the pwers of the European Parliament. Revisionist approaches, however, suggest that the conditional agenda-setting powers accorded to the Parliament by the co-operation procedure are more important than the veto powers ascribed by co-decision. Our analysis demonstrates not only that both claims are correct, but also why. On the aggregate there is a higher success rate or parliamentary amendements under co-decision (I) thatn under co-operation, just as the data published by the EP indicate. However, controlling for one of the conditions of conditional agenda setting (agreement by the commision under co-operation), conditional agenda setting empowers the EP more than veto powers. Finally, control of Commission behaviour in both procedures indicates no difference in acceptance rates between co-operation and co-decision. Our analysis explains why all three points above are true. The answer hinges on the activity of the Commission, which was more hostile to parliamentary amendments during the 1989-94 period (more amendments were rejected during this period than during any other period under both co-operation and co-decision). In addition, the power of the Commission has declined under co-decision (because it can be and is more frequently overruled by the other two players, whether its opinion is positive or negative)
