| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
02279naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
|---|
| control field |
8622 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20190211154516.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
021125s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] |
PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
|---|
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Legislative procedures in the European Union : |
| Remainder of title |
an empirical analysis |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2001 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
This article analyses the roel of the commission, the Parliamente, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union:co-operation and co-decision(I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendements. These procedures have been the subject of agreat deal of theoretical debate. According to coventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the pwers of the European Parliament. Revisionist approaches, however, suggest that the conditional agenda-setting powers accorded to the Parliament by the co-operation procedure are more important than the veto powers ascribed by co-decision. Our analysis demonstrates not only that both claims are correct, but also why. On the aggregate there is a higher success rate or parliamentary amendements under co-decision (I) thatn under co-operation, just as the data published by the EP indicate. However, controlling for one of the conditions of conditional agenda setting (agreement by the commision under co-operation), conditional agenda setting empowers the EP more than veto powers. Finally, control of Commission behaviour in both procedures indicates no difference in acceptance rates between co-operation and co-decision. Our analysis explains why all three points above are true. The answer hinges on the activity of the Commission, which was more hostile to parliamentary amendments during the 1989-94 period (more amendments were rejected during this period than during any other period under both co-operation and co-decision). In addition, the power of the Commission has declined under co-decision (because it can be and is more frequently overruled by the other two players, whether its opinion is positive or negative) |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Title |
British Journal of Political Science |
| Related parts |
31, 4, p. 573-599 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication |
, 2001 |
| Record control number |
|
| 700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
|
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha item type |
Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20021125 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
Cassio |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Cassio |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20060621 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
1713^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Quiteria |
