| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01096naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
|---|
| control field |
10706 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20190211155135.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
030203s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] |
PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
|---|
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
GERARDI, Dino |
| 9 (RLIN) |
4020 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Jury verdicts and preference diversity |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2000 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
I develop a model of decision making in juries when there is uncertainty about juror`s preferencs. I provide a characterization of the equilibrium strategy under any voting rule and show that nonunanimous rules are asymptotically efficient. Specifically, large juries make the correct decision with probability close to one. My analysis also demonstrates that under the unanimous rule, large juries almost never convict the defendant. The last result contrasts markedly with the literature and suggests that be unanimity rule can protect the innocent only at the rice of acquitting the guilty |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Title |
American Political Science Review |
| Related parts |
94, 2, p. 395-406 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication |
, 2000 |
| Record control number |
|
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha item type |
Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20030203 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
Cassio |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Cassio |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20060726 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
1032^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Quiteria |
