Jury verdicts and preference diversity
By: GERARDI, Dino
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2000American Political Science Review 94, 2, p. 395-406Abstract: I develop a model of decision making in juries when there is uncertainty about juror`s preferencs. I provide a characterization of the equilibrium strategy under any voting rule and show that nonunanimous rules are asymptotically efficient. Specifically, large juries make the correct decision with probability close to one. My analysis also demonstrates that under the unanimous rule, large juries almost never convict the defendant. The last result contrasts markedly with the literature and suggests that be unanimity rule can protect the innocent only at the rice of acquitting the guilty
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
I develop a model of decision making in juries when there is uncertainty about juror`s preferencs. I provide a characterization of the equilibrium strategy under any voting rule and show that nonunanimous rules are asymptotically efficient. Specifically, large juries make the correct decision with probability close to one. My analysis also demonstrates that under the unanimous rule, large juries almost never convict the defendant. The last result contrasts markedly with the literature and suggests that be unanimity rule can protect the innocent only at the rice of acquitting the guilty
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