000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
03879nam a2200253uu 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
control field |
1553 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20191016062526.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
001023s1995 xx ||||g| |0|| 0 eng d |
090 ## - LOCALLY ASSIGNED LC-TYPE CALL NUMBER (OCLC); LOCAL CALL NUMBER (RLIN) |
Classification number (OCLC) (R) ; Classification number, CALL (RLIN) (NR) |
6.05 |
Local cutter number (OCLC) ; Book number/undivided call number, CALL (RLIN) |
E1975e |
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] |
PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
The economics of organized crime |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. |
Cambridge : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
Cambridge University, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
1995 |
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
Extent |
301 p. |
505 80 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
Title |
1 - Introduction |
-- |
1 - Overview |
-- |
2 - Alternative views on the nature of organised crime |
-- |
3 - Theories of the state and criminal organisations |
-- |
4 - The activities of organised crime |
-- |
5 - Problems in normative analysis |
-- |
6 - Alternative deterrence policies |
-- |
7 - Conclusions |
-- |
Part I - Theories of the state and the origin of criminal organisations |
-- |
2 - Organised crime, mafia and governments |
-- |
1 - Introduction |
-- |
2 - Why mafias develop |
-- |
3 - The american and sicilian mafias and the business firm |
-- |
4 - Transaction cost analysis and the Sicilian mafia |
-- |
5 - Public policy implications and further research |
-- |
3 - Gangs as primitive states |
-- |
1 - Introduction |
-- |
2 - Origins in anarchy |
-- |
3 - Evolution |
-- |
4 - Concluding comments |
-- |
Part II - The criminal organisation as a firm |
-- |
4 - Internal cohesion and competition among criminal organisations |
-- |
1 - Introductions |
-- |
2 - The military technology and the probability of success |
-- |
3 - Internal contracts and the dimension of the organisation: the monopsony case |
-- |
4 - Internal organisation and competition amog rival families |
-- |
5 - Conclusions |
-- |
5 - Conspiracy among the many: the mafia in legitimate industries |
-- |
1 - Introduction |
-- |
2 - The form of cartel agreements |
-- |
3 - A comparison of the Sicilian and New York mafias |
-- |
4 - Instances of mafia cartels |
-- |
5 - Conditions of emergence |
-- |
6 - Consequences |
-- |
7 - Conditions of disappearance |
-- |
8 - Prices and profits |
-- |
9 - Conclusions |
-- |
Part III - Organised crime and state intervention in the economy |
-- |
6 - Rival kleptocrats: the mafia versus the state |
-- |
1 - Introduction |
-- |
2 - Production with a monopoly state |
-- |
3 - Welfare maximisation with a monopoly state |
-- |
4 - Kleptocratic policy with a monopoly state |
-- |
5 - The mafia as an alternative provider of public services |
-- |
6 - Nash equilibrium |
-- |
7 - Disruptive effects of the mafia |
-- |
8 - Conclusions |
-- |
7 - Corruption: arm's-length relationships and markets |
-- |
1 - Introduction |
-- |
2 - Markets and government |
-- |
3 - Arm's-length relationships and cultures |
-- |
4 - On corruption |
-- |
5 - Economic consequences of corruption |
-- |
6 - Policy implications |
-- |
7 - Corruption and organised crime |
-- |
8 - Concluding remarks |
-- |
Part IV - Deterrence policies against legal firms involved in illegal activities |
-- |
8 - Auditing with 'ghosts' |
-- |
1 - Introduction |
-- |
2 - The model |
-- |
3 - Random audit |
-- |
4 - Conditioning audit probability on reportes output |
-- |
5 - Random audit versus the cut-off rule |
-- |
6 - Conclusion |
-- |
9 - The reputational penalty firms bear from commiting criminal fraud |
-- |
1 - Introduction |
-- |
2 - The theory of criminal penalties for frauds |
-- |
3 - Data and empirical method |
-- |
4 - Empirical results: stock return forecast errors |
-- |
5 - The amount of lost reputation |
-- |
6 - Comparing the expected penalty to the cost of the crime |
-- |
7 - Earnings changes around corporate fraud announcements |
-- |
8 - Aggregate wealth effects of the sentencing commission's guidelines |
-- |
9 - Conclusion |
-- |
Part V - Deterrence policies against organised crime |
-- |
10 - Regulating the organised crime sector |
-- |
1 - Introduction |
-- |
2 - Description of the setting |
-- |
3 - The model |
-- |
4 - Government commitment strategies |
-- |
5 - Conclusion |
-- |
11 - Oligopolistic competition in illegal markets |
-- |
1 - Introduction |
-- |
2 - Competition in outputs |
-- |
3 - Competition in prices |
-- |
4 - Conclusions |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Sociedade Contemporânea |
9 (RLIN) |
12549 |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Economia Informal |
9 (RLIN) |
13035 |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Criminalidade |
9 (RLIN) |
12141 |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
9 (RLIN) |
15163 |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Corrupção |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
|
9 (RLIN) |
13827 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Koha item type |
Livro Geral |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
-- |
20001023 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
Maria |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Maria do Carmo Raphael |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
-- |
20160310 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
1633^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Ana |