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The economics of organized crime

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Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University, 1995Description: 301 p.Subject(s): Sociedade Contemporânea | Economia Informal | Criminalidade | Corrupção
Contents:
1 - Introduction 1 - Overview 2 - Alternative views on the nature of organised crime 3 - Theories of the state and criminal organisations 4 - The activities of organised crime 5 - Problems in normative analysis 6 - Alternative deterrence policies 7 - Conclusions Part I - Theories of the state and the origin of criminal organisations 2 - Organised crime, mafia and governments 1 - Introduction 2 - Why mafias develop 3 - The american and sicilian mafias and the business firm 4 - Transaction cost analysis and the Sicilian mafia 5 - Public policy implications and further research 3 - Gangs as primitive states 1 - Introduction 2 - Origins in anarchy 3 - Evolution 4 - Concluding comments Part II - The criminal organisation as a firm 4 - Internal cohesion and competition among criminal organisations 1 - Introductions 2 - The military technology and the probability of success 3 - Internal contracts and the dimension of the organisation: the monopsony case 4 - Internal organisation and competition amog rival families 5 - Conclusions 5 - Conspiracy among the many: the mafia in legitimate industries 1 - Introduction 2 - The form of cartel agreements 3 - A comparison of the Sicilian and New York mafias 4 - Instances of mafia cartels 5 - Conditions of emergence 6 - Consequences 7 - Conditions of disappearance 8 - Prices and profits 9 - Conclusions Part III - Organised crime and state intervention in the economy 6 - Rival kleptocrats: the mafia versus the state 1 - Introduction 2 - Production with a monopoly state 3 - Welfare maximisation with a monopoly state 4 - Kleptocratic policy with a monopoly state 5 - The mafia as an alternative provider of public services 6 - Nash equilibrium 7 - Disruptive effects of the mafia 8 - Conclusions 7 - Corruption: arm's-length relationships and markets 1 - Introduction 2 - Markets and government 3 - Arm's-length relationships and cultures 4 - On corruption 5 - Economic consequences of corruption 6 - Policy implications 7 - Corruption and organised crime 8 - Concluding remarks Part IV - Deterrence policies against legal firms involved in illegal activities 8 - Auditing with 'ghosts' 1 - Introduction 2 - The model 3 - Random audit 4 - Conditioning audit probability on reportes output 5 - Random audit versus the cut-off rule 6 - Conclusion 9 - The reputational penalty firms bear from commiting criminal fraud 1 - Introduction 2 - The theory of criminal penalties for frauds 3 - Data and empirical method 4 - Empirical results: stock return forecast errors 5 - The amount of lost reputation 6 - Comparing the expected penalty to the cost of the crime 7 - Earnings changes around corporate fraud announcements 8 - Aggregate wealth effects of the sentencing commission's guidelines 9 - Conclusion Part V - Deterrence policies against organised crime 10 - Regulating the organised crime sector 1 - Introduction 2 - Description of the setting 3 - The model 4 - Government commitment strategies 5 - Conclusion 11 - Oligopolistic competition in illegal markets 1 - Introduction 2 - Competition in outputs 3 - Competition in prices 4 - Conclusions
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Livro Geral Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
Livro Geral 6.05E1975e (Browse shelf) 1 Available 10001899

1 - Introduction 1 - Overview 2 - Alternative views on the nature of organised crime 3 - Theories of the state and criminal organisations 4 - The activities of organised crime 5 - Problems in normative analysis 6 - Alternative deterrence policies 7 - Conclusions Part I - Theories of the state and the origin of criminal organisations 2 - Organised crime, mafia and governments 1 - Introduction 2 - Why mafias develop 3 - The american and sicilian mafias and the business firm 4 - Transaction cost analysis and the Sicilian mafia 5 - Public policy implications and further research 3 - Gangs as primitive states 1 - Introduction 2 - Origins in anarchy 3 - Evolution 4 - Concluding comments Part II - The criminal organisation as a firm 4 - Internal cohesion and competition among criminal organisations 1 - Introductions 2 - The military technology and the probability of success 3 - Internal contracts and the dimension of the organisation: the monopsony case 4 - Internal organisation and competition amog rival families 5 - Conclusions 5 - Conspiracy among the many: the mafia in legitimate industries 1 - Introduction 2 - The form of cartel agreements 3 - A comparison of the Sicilian and New York mafias 4 - Instances of mafia cartels 5 - Conditions of emergence 6 - Consequences 7 - Conditions of disappearance 8 - Prices and profits 9 - Conclusions Part III - Organised crime and state intervention in the economy 6 - Rival kleptocrats: the mafia versus the state 1 - Introduction 2 - Production with a monopoly state 3 - Welfare maximisation with a monopoly state 4 - Kleptocratic policy with a monopoly state 5 - The mafia as an alternative provider of public services 6 - Nash equilibrium 7 - Disruptive effects of the mafia 8 - Conclusions 7 - Corruption: arm's-length relationships and markets 1 - Introduction 2 - Markets and government 3 - Arm's-length relationships and cultures 4 - On corruption 5 - Economic consequences of corruption 6 - Policy implications 7 - Corruption and organised crime 8 - Concluding remarks Part IV - Deterrence policies against legal firms involved in illegal activities 8 - Auditing with 'ghosts' 1 - Introduction 2 - The model 3 - Random audit 4 - Conditioning audit probability on reportes output 5 - Random audit versus the cut-off rule 6 - Conclusion 9 - The reputational penalty firms bear from commiting criminal fraud 1 - Introduction 2 - The theory of criminal penalties for frauds 3 - Data and empirical method 4 - Empirical results: stock return forecast errors 5 - The amount of lost reputation 6 - Comparing the expected penalty to the cost of the crime 7 - Earnings changes around corporate fraud announcements 8 - Aggregate wealth effects of the sentencing commission's guidelines 9 - Conclusion Part V - Deterrence policies against organised crime 10 - Regulating the organised crime sector 1 - Introduction 2 - Description of the setting 3 - The model 4 - Government commitment strategies 5 - Conclusion 11 - Oligopolistic competition in illegal markets 1 - Introduction 2 - Competition in outputs 3 - Competition in prices 4 - Conclusions

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