Explaining interethnic cooperation (Record no. 21818)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01727naa a2200193uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 7011615365410 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211162307.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 070116s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | FEARON, James D. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 30321 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Explaining interethnic cooperation |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York, NY : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | December 1996 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Though both journalists and academic literature on ethnic conflict give the opposite impression, peaceful and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more commom than is large-scale violence. We seek to explain this norm of interethnic peace and how it occasionally breaks down, arguing that formal and informal institutions usually work to contain or "cauterize" disputes between individual members of different groups. Using a social matching game model, we show that local-level interethnic cooperation can be supported in essentially two ways. In spiral equilibria, disputes between individuals are correctly expected, to spiral rapidly beyond the two parties, and fear this induces cooperation "on the equilibrium path". In in-group policing equilibria, individuals ignore transgressions by members of the other group, correctlyexpecting that the culprits will be indentified and sanctioned by their own ethic brethren. A range of examples suggests that both equilibria occur empirically and have properties expected from the theoretical analysis |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | LAITIN, David D |
| 9 (RLIN) | 29525 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | American Political Science Review |
| Related parts | 90, 4, p. 715-735 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1996 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0003-0554 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20070116 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1536^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20070116 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1537^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
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