Explaining interethnic cooperation
By: FEARON, James D
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Contributor(s): LAITIN, David D.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1996American Political Science Review 90, 4, p. 715-735Abstract: Though both journalists and academic literature on ethnic conflict give the opposite impression, peaceful and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more commom than is large-scale violence. We seek to explain this norm of interethnic peace and how it occasionally breaks down, arguing that formal and informal institutions usually work to contain or "cauterize" disputes between individual members of different groups. Using a social matching game model, we show that local-level interethnic cooperation can be supported in essentially two ways. In spiral equilibria, disputes between individuals are correctly expected, to spiral rapidly beyond the two parties, and fear this induces cooperation "on the equilibrium path". In in-group policing equilibria, individuals ignore transgressions by members of the other group, correctlyexpecting that the culprits will be indentified and sanctioned by their own ethic brethren. A range of examples suggests that both equilibria occur empirically and have properties expected from the theoretical analysis
Though both journalists and academic literature on ethnic conflict give the opposite impression, peaceful and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more commom than is large-scale violence. We seek to explain this norm of interethnic peace and how it occasionally breaks down, arguing that formal and informal institutions usually work to contain or "cauterize" disputes between individual members of different groups. Using a social matching game model, we show that local-level interethnic cooperation can be supported in essentially two ways. In spiral equilibria, disputes between individuals are correctly expected, to spiral rapidly beyond the two parties, and fear this induces cooperation "on the equilibrium path". In in-group policing equilibria, individuals ignore transgressions by members of the other group, correctlyexpecting that the culprits will be indentified and sanctioned by their own ethic brethren. A range of examples suggests that both equilibria occur empirically and have properties expected from the theoretical analysis
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